Y
Yard Ape
Guest
Defence shouldn‘t be based on miracles
January 17, 2002
Southam News
Canadians have high expectations of the 750 men and women of our Armed Forces leaving for war in Afghanistan.
Soldiers of Lord Strathcona‘s Horse and Princess Patricia‘s Canadian Light Infantry are likely to operate aggressively with U.S. forces against pockets of al-Qaeda resistance.
No doubt they will do well. That is not necessarily to the Canadian Forces‘ advantage.
Historically, the Forces have done too well, too often, by creatively working around the difficulties imposed by outdated equipment, too few soldiers, sailors and airmen and a warm and fuzzy mandate that belied what armed forces exist to do. They have often provided federal governments with a journeyman job and a public relations prize.
They have also spared governments from the consequences of a generation of military atrophy. A creditable Canadian performance in Afghanistan will be presented as a vindication of military policy, but it won‘t be.
For the Forces, a few weeks of public esteem will be followed by more years of benign neglect -- at least, we suppose it to be benign -- and continued bland assurances that all is well.
The truth is the Afghanistan mission is tiny in terms of what modern armies do, but is a considerable effort for Canada. A successful outcome -- even the capture of Osama bin Laden by the PPCLI -- won‘t change the reality that this country has too few soldiers with too few modern combat vehicles or other equipment, a fighter fleet that is half-mothballed and warships that are tied up for want of crews.
Government‘s core business is internal order and external protection, but for years, Canada‘s peacetime preparedness has been the despair of its allies and its citizens alike.
Instead of giving the Canadian Forces priority, successive administrations routinely robbed defence to pay for other programs, relying on the United States for continental protection, and American and European allies for global security.
Meanwhile, the Armed Forces were used to advance social agendas of no military importance, at the expense of real soldiering. Firm handling of the Airborne‘s disciplinary problems, for instance, would have been a far more militarily useful measure than setting quotas for the recruitment of visible minorities or mandating that women serve on submarines. But the fighting regiment was disbanded, while $1-million was spent to develop a combat bra for Canada‘s 5,500 enlisted women.
By 2001, the Forces were having difficulty maintaining even the much- reduced complement authorized in 1994, when force levels were cut from 80,000 to 60,000 as a cost-saving measure. Modest pay raises and an aggressive recruiting drive have yet to restore numbers, although at least the direction is encouraging.
In a December interview, Jean Chrétien, the Prime Minister, wrote off critics of Canada‘s military unpreparedness as stooges for companies making and selling weapons. That was an egregious slight to a proud army with real needs.
A country that values its sovereignty must invest significantly more than does Canada in self-protection. The $11.2-billion allocated to defence represents just 1.1% of our gross domestic product. This compares to 3.2% for the United States, 2.7% for Great Britain and 2.5% for France. Even Portugal spends 2.6%. In NATO, only Luxembourg spends less. December‘s so-called security budget, with $1.2-billion to national defence over three years, was a start but does not do nearly enough.
As the new Deputy Prime Minister John Manley acknowledged last fall, when he was foreign affairs minister, Canada has freeloaded off its allies for decades. Here‘s hoping he and his colleagues walk that talk. As Canadian troops place themselves in harm‘s way to protect Western societies from terrorism, it should be acknowledged Canada has also freeloaded off its soldiers, giving them a knife and telling them to prepare for a gunfight.
It won‘t do. Canadians cheering our troops on their way must assume the obligation to compel the government to buy the equipment and above all hire the men and women it takes.
Every successful operation shouldn‘t be a little miracle.
January 17, 2002
Southam News
Canadians have high expectations of the 750 men and women of our Armed Forces leaving for war in Afghanistan.
Soldiers of Lord Strathcona‘s Horse and Princess Patricia‘s Canadian Light Infantry are likely to operate aggressively with U.S. forces against pockets of al-Qaeda resistance.
No doubt they will do well. That is not necessarily to the Canadian Forces‘ advantage.
Historically, the Forces have done too well, too often, by creatively working around the difficulties imposed by outdated equipment, too few soldiers, sailors and airmen and a warm and fuzzy mandate that belied what armed forces exist to do. They have often provided federal governments with a journeyman job and a public relations prize.
They have also spared governments from the consequences of a generation of military atrophy. A creditable Canadian performance in Afghanistan will be presented as a vindication of military policy, but it won‘t be.
For the Forces, a few weeks of public esteem will be followed by more years of benign neglect -- at least, we suppose it to be benign -- and continued bland assurances that all is well.
The truth is the Afghanistan mission is tiny in terms of what modern armies do, but is a considerable effort for Canada. A successful outcome -- even the capture of Osama bin Laden by the PPCLI -- won‘t change the reality that this country has too few soldiers with too few modern combat vehicles or other equipment, a fighter fleet that is half-mothballed and warships that are tied up for want of crews.
Government‘s core business is internal order and external protection, but for years, Canada‘s peacetime preparedness has been the despair of its allies and its citizens alike.
Instead of giving the Canadian Forces priority, successive administrations routinely robbed defence to pay for other programs, relying on the United States for continental protection, and American and European allies for global security.
Meanwhile, the Armed Forces were used to advance social agendas of no military importance, at the expense of real soldiering. Firm handling of the Airborne‘s disciplinary problems, for instance, would have been a far more militarily useful measure than setting quotas for the recruitment of visible minorities or mandating that women serve on submarines. But the fighting regiment was disbanded, while $1-million was spent to develop a combat bra for Canada‘s 5,500 enlisted women.
By 2001, the Forces were having difficulty maintaining even the much- reduced complement authorized in 1994, when force levels were cut from 80,000 to 60,000 as a cost-saving measure. Modest pay raises and an aggressive recruiting drive have yet to restore numbers, although at least the direction is encouraging.
In a December interview, Jean Chrétien, the Prime Minister, wrote off critics of Canada‘s military unpreparedness as stooges for companies making and selling weapons. That was an egregious slight to a proud army with real needs.
A country that values its sovereignty must invest significantly more than does Canada in self-protection. The $11.2-billion allocated to defence represents just 1.1% of our gross domestic product. This compares to 3.2% for the United States, 2.7% for Great Britain and 2.5% for France. Even Portugal spends 2.6%. In NATO, only Luxembourg spends less. December‘s so-called security budget, with $1.2-billion to national defence over three years, was a start but does not do nearly enough.
As the new Deputy Prime Minister John Manley acknowledged last fall, when he was foreign affairs minister, Canada has freeloaded off its allies for decades. Here‘s hoping he and his colleagues walk that talk. As Canadian troops place themselves in harm‘s way to protect Western societies from terrorism, it should be acknowledged Canada has also freeloaded off its soldiers, giving them a knife and telling them to prepare for a gunfight.
It won‘t do. Canadians cheering our troops on their way must assume the obligation to compel the government to buy the equipment and above all hire the men and women it takes.
Every successful operation shouldn‘t be a little miracle.
And I would still be one unhappy cherry if any of them got dinged.
