Future Armour

[TangoTwoBravo]

Apologize in advance for a long and winding post...

One problem with having some tanks with "tank killing guns" and others with "bunker-busters" is what happens when one meets an opponent of the wrong type?  I beleive that both German and British tank units in early WWII had "close support" tanks mixed in with tanks with higher velocity "tank killing" guns.  The early war German tank company had a platoon of Mk IVs with the short 75mm to fire HE and two platoons with Mk IIIs with 37mm and then 50m guns to deal with tanks.  The Brits tended to have "close support" tanks with low velocity but larget calibre guns in the Sqn HQ and the rest of the tanks had guns that fired only AP (mostly 40mm I believe).

I don't think that either found the arrangement completely satisfatory, as the complexities of close combat mean can make it hard to rely on having exactly the right tank in the right place at the right time.  It is a specialized case, but I studied the Dieppe raid from a tank perspective several years ago.  Most of the Churchills were armed with 6 pdrs, well suited for engaging the German tanks of the time but lacking HE ability.  There were some Chuchchills armed with close support guns (3 inchers in the hull I believe) in the Sqn HQs.  Unfortunately (buried among many misfortunes), the CS versions didn't make it off the beach.  Many of the 6 pdr versions did make it off the beach to the esplanade, but their guns were not suited to the types of targets they faced (buildings, bunkers etc).  This would not have changed the ultimate outcome of the raid, but at least the force would have had some more fire support if all Churchills had had dual pupose armament (later Churchills had the dual purpose 75mm gun).

Continuing this Dieppe tangent, one direct outcome from an armoured perspective was the AVRE, which mounted a short ranged demolition gun very well suited to dealing with bunkers, buildings and obstacles.  The Germans developed the Brumbar (a turretless Mk IV with a 150mm short ranged assault gun) out of their Stalingrad experience, and kept these as higher level assets.  My take is that you have most of your tanks "all-purpose", while maintaining some specialized armour to deal with special situations and tasked them out accordingly.

German tank companies by 1944 would have one type of tank (either MkIVH with a long 75mm or a Panther with an even longer 75mm).  Both had dual purpose rounds.  The Brits and US still had various "close support" tanks with large calibre guns but most tanks were able to engage both types of targets, although most Shermans had trouble with German tanks.  US Armor was handicaped by doctrinal dogmatism that saw tanks engaging soft targets and tank destroyers killing enemy tanks.  Sounded good on paper but it did not work very well in practice.  The Brits and Canadians had the Sherman Firefly with the 17 pdr mixed in to their Sqns and Tps to give some added AT punch.  The ratio and organization of Firefly to normal Sherman evolved throughout the Normandy and North West Europe campaign, but in general terms the 75mm Shermans would deal with soft-targets and the 17 pdrs would deal with Panthers and other nasties.  If they could have, would they have gone with all-Firefly?

Looking at Iraq today, one could be tempted to opt for the late-war British/Canadian tank sqn.  Most tanks would have guns optimized for infantry targets, with some specialized for dealing with the odd enemy AFV.  What happens, however, in five years when that tank company has to face an opponent who has mostly MBTs?  If we want flexibility then perhaps we seek it through specialized ammunition as opposed to specialized guns.

Perhaps I am stuck in 1944 (it sure looks that way sometimes).  Still, a force of M1A2s (or its Euro/Brit cousins) with access to SABOT and MPAT can engage a wide variety of targets in a wide variety of terrains.  Extreme close range will always be a problem.  Perhaps we do examine a new AVRE with a monster demolition gun to deal with bunkers.  I would still have every tank up front armed for dual-purpose.  You can't always pick your opponents and the enemy has a say.  Would we be happy with an infantry section or platoon that had to rely on other assets to deal with armour? 

To link with our threads on "ISTAR thresholds", if we have greater uncertainty then we need greater flexibility in our front-line systems seeking contact with the enemy.  They guys up front need to be as general-purpose as possible.  Once we define the situation we can employ our specialzed assets to deal with particular threats.

Future tanks should be designed to be as survivable, hard hitting and versatile as possible.  If it means that you can only have 100 tanks vs 200 cheaper ones I would still go for the more expensive and more capable.  Easy for me to say from down here chain!

Sorry again,

2B

 

[a_majoor]

Ah, irony. We are looking for a generation four tank and end up with rebuilt Leopard 1s!

Not that this is a bad idea; there are thousands of Leopards in service, and the Leopard 1 design can be up gunned to a 120mm if desired. Lots of other things can be done as well in terms of upgrades with a new powerpack, suspension, modular armour and upgraded optics and electronics (think of the M-60 in Israeli hands turning into the Magach 7). Close support tanks could go the way of Matt Fisher's proposed CAT conversion, with a breach loading 120mm as the main weapon and various mods for operations in urban/complex terrain. (Of course, I will insist they go to the support company of an Infantry battalion. Tankers serving in the company can put on green berets, naturally  )

On the other hand, the basic structure is getting on, with hulls and turrets being built in the 1960s and 70's.

My own preference would be to evolve from a newer platform like the CV-90120 if weight and strategic/operational mobility is the highest priority, and evolving from the Leopard 2 family (Leopard 2A7) with some reductions in size and weight if protection and tactical use in close terrain is considered the key factor.

A side note, the AMX-30 family had a coaxial 30mm cannon, and the Strv 2000 concept had a 40mm coax, both designs having independent elevation from the main gun. Does this seem to be a good idea especially as a means of engaging high angle targets in a 3D environment (as well as being able to take out secondary targets that do not require the main gun)?

 

[DG-41]

Ah, irony. We are looking for a generation four tank and end up with rebuilt Leopard 1s!

I think the idea was more along the vein of a Gen4 tank that was *effectively* an updated Leo1, rather than actually updating the Leo1.

Start with the Leo1 as a benchmark, and then design a new system that keeps all the good features of Leo1, addresses the shortcomings of Leo1, and wherever possible (without sacrificing capability) cost-reduce the hell out of the thing. The aim being to get a more user-friendly, cheaper, possibly made in Canada Leo-alike.

Part of this process is threat assessment, and it seems to me that the most likely MBTs we would run up against in our Leo-alike would be former Soviet equipment. If we can take on T55/T64/T72/T80 from the front arc, and resist same from the front arc, I think that should be "good enough" for MBT capability.

How does the existing LeoC2 measure up in that regard?

DG

 

[Kirkhill]

Does length of gun matter in urban ops?

The dual purpose 75mm of the Sherman was a short weapon.  Did that give it a manoeuvring advantage in clearing villages, in bocage, in rubble filled streets?  I am fairly sure that it was an imperfect anti-tank weapon.  Witness the 17pdr modifications, a longer weapon.

The Cavalry has tried to steer clear of urban ops for a long, long while.  It was anathema to NATO's Cold War Forces.  Why not accept this?

Cavalry as an open country force.  Infantry as an Urban force. Or some other such split.

I am not a fan of one platform trying to be everything - IFVs in general and the Bradley in particular are not favourites of mine.  The combination of too many capabilities on one platform results in too many design compromises.  Too tall to be a fighting vehicle.  Too big to be sufficiently armoured to close with the enemy, not to mention the load imposed on track life and roads.  Too small to carry a "standard" tactical element of infanteers.  Too much vibration to maintain the TOWs.........

I prefer to buy the right horse for the right course, group them tactically with other types of "horses" to achieve a desirable outcome, and train the tactical grouping to perform acceptably in the face of the threat.  When the threat changes, reorg and retrain.

Looking at that last paragraph, that last sentence, that is the ultimate problem that we face.  Not that the weapons systems are not available, either on our shelf or someone else's,  perhaps not even that the weapons are not up to a particular standard.  It is the inflexibility of the very component of the forces that should be most flexible - the organization, the command structure, the people.

2B. 

You suggested that in the current war a mixed organization might be heavy on Infantry support tanks and light of Cruisers (MBTs). In the next war you might need Cruisers more than Inf Spt.  Then what would you do?

My humble suggestion would be to ReOrg. 

That would require regrouping available assets.  So what?  Your average Inf Coy Cmdr has to deal with that on a mission by mission basis.

What the baseline org is: Mixed Troop, Mixed Squadron, Mixed Regiment, Mixed Brigade, Division, Corps or Army, and the nature of the mix is the subject of interminable debate.

My preference is to keep the individual weapons systems tightly focused as to purpose, which contributes to size reduction, which contributes to improved passive defence - both armour (preferably modular and layered) and profile, which contributes to tactical, operational and strategic mobility.  While the weapon system itself might be inflexible the resulting teams could be very flexible.

Create the teams from sound components in order to meet the current threat, train the team, fight the team and reorg when the enemy readjusts.  One man's "ad hocery" is another's "flexibility".

Fighting vehicles in open country has little in common with fighting people in towns, forests, swamps and mountains.  Likewise transporting troops in town, delivering troops during assaults in town is different than transporting troops in open country ( in fact many Cavalry thinkers have questioned the need for dismounts in the Cavalry battle at all).  Different battles require different tools.

A final point, trying to be all things to all people breeds complexity and complexity breeds expense and degraded performance.  It is not good practice for a business,  a plane, a ship or a tank.

I have no argument with one gun launching many types of ammunition - I do have a problem with one platform having many guns AND a pile of dismounts supposedly able to handle all threats. 

You are not alone on the field.

Culloden 1746 - Bayonets vs Swords.  Previous battles: bayonets got their clocks cleaned by swords because the individual with bayonet entered into a duel with an individual with a sword.    At Culloden, when individual with sword raised sword to engage in duel individual with bayonet ignored hairy bugger and relied on his buddy on his left to spear individual with sword.  First bayonet engaged man with sword challenging buddy on the other side who was also studiously ignoring the sword bearing threat charging at him.  This happened all the way down the line.  Result?  Thousands of dead Highlanders against tens of dead Brits.

It boils down to trust, mutual support, training and flexibility.

Artillery's motto is Ubique. Everywhere. They earned this motto in part by focusing on delivering a massive amount of energy on target. This is done by a variety of means but always a variant of the single tube delivery system (MRLs aside).  Thus their tool box of weapons allows them to get operate ubiquitously in support of all operations.

Battleships, with weapons to defeat all known threats, seem to be somewhat less ubiquitous.

Cheers.

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Kirkhill,

I'd rather not have "cruiser" and "infantry" tanks but stick with one MBT.

Conventional wisdom is that tanks do not belong in cities.  The Russian experience in Grozny might support this, but US experience in Iraq seems to indicate that tanks are invaluable in cities as long as they can withstand RPGs and have dual-purpose ammo.

I want to keep the tanks as general as possible because prediction is difficult.  A tank like the M1A2 can be applied to any conflict. It may not be optimized for each scenario, but this is were supporting arms can mitigate.  I could be accused of wanting to have my cake and eat it to, in that I want general purpose tanks but an army with specialized branches.  How do I reconcile?

The troops in contact, be they on foot or in vehicles, are going into an uncertain tactical situation at virtually all times.  The leading edge of the force, even with excellent ISTAR, is entering an unknown and does not necessarily control the sequence of engagement.  The lead tank of a combined arms team might run into a truck with Milan on top one bound, a T72 the next, a fortified building around the corner, a village that must be cleared or a desert that must be crossed.  As such their combat systems must be versatile.  The same goes for the infantry.  As long as each work together they can complement each other.  That being said, coordination is difficult.  It can be hard enough to integrate tanks and infantry without adding in specialized tanks in each team.

Specialized tanks allows the enemy to take out the whole team by taking out certain elements.  Picture a Troop of our tanks with two "tank killers" and two "bunker-busters."  It enters into a meeting engagement with an enemy who has four general purpose tanks.  Only two of our tanks will be of use, and the enemy only has to kill one of our "tank-killers" to have a huge advantage.  The same could be said if this troop has to support the infantry clearing a position or fight through a city in that only half of the troop will be able to do anything. 

If the cost of dual-purpose (or even all-purpose) tanks is money and inefficiency then I think we should be willing to pay it.  While we are cyphering, is it really cheaper to have 50 "tank-killers" and 50 "bunker-busters" or 100 all purpose "gunslingers"?

In longer range terms there is even more uncertainty facing an army.  The recent past can offer a guide, but the future is unknown.  Troops will go into situations with the kit they have and will rarely have time to acquire new systems to deal with each new theatre.  Western expeditionary armies should be based on flexible systems.  The M1 was designed for more or less open fighting against other tanks.  It has excelled at that, but it has also proven itself in urban battles against irregulars.  It's ammo needed to be tweaked and some better protection for MGs devised but otherwise the basic design has translated well to urban ops.  Could the inverse also be true?  Could a tank designed to take out insurgents in a city be able to deal with enemy tanks in the open? 

We could certainly use some of the heavy APCs that we talk about, and specialized "armour" has a place for specialized situations.  I would still argue, however, that our gun tanks need to be as all-purpose as feasible. 

Cheers,

2B

 

[Kirkhill]

Kirkhill,

I'd rather not have "cruiser" and "infantry" tanks but stick with one MBT.

That's obvious.   ;D

Conventional wisdom is that tanks do not belong in cities.   The Russian experience in Grozny might support this, but US experience in Iraq seems to indicate that tanks are invaluable in cities as long as they can withstand RPGs and have dual-purpose ammo.

Accepted

I want to keep the tanks as general as possible because prediction is difficult.   OK

A tank like the M1A2 can be applied to any conflict.   Disagree.   It can't contribute where it can't go.   And that includes narrow city streets unless the intention is to eliminate the street.  

It may not be optimized for each scenario, but this is were supporting arms can mitigate.   Mitigate?   Improve a situation where the all-powerful, lord-of-the-battlefield tank is temporarily hindered? I think I perceive the root of our disagreement.   Not all battlefields are tank-suitable IMHO.   Not all battles demand general destruction and mayhem.  

I could be accused of wanting to have my cake and eat it to, (consider it done) in that I want general purpose tanks but an army with specialized branches.   How do I reconcile?

The troops in contact, be they on foot or in vehicles, are going into an uncertain tactical situation at virtually all times. (Stipulated)   The leading edge of the force, even with excellent ISTAR, is entering an unknown and does not necessarily control the sequence of engagement.  Ditto The lead tank of a combined arms team might run into a truck with Milan on top one bound, a T72 the next, a fortified building around the corner, a village that must be cleared or a desert that must be crossed (How poor is the intelligence you are getting these days that you aren't aware of upcoming deserts and villages?   Buildings I might be able to understand)   As such their combat systems must be versatile.  (Regardless of all previous snide remarks, stipulated) The same goes for the infantry.   (Likewise) As long as each work together they can complement each other. (Wholeheartedly agreed.)   That being said, coordination is difficult.   It can be hard enough to integrate tanks and infantry without adding in specialized tanks in each team. (OK here is where I take issue -   Coordination IS difficult.   But isn't that what you as a Troop Commander, Squadron/Combat Team Leader, Regiment/Battle Group Commander are paid for?   As a Troop Leader (by the way are you leaders or commanders these days?) do you spend your time finding targets for your gunner, targets for your other tank commanders or coordinating the activities of the tanks under command?   How do you deal with co-ordination problems? By training, n'est-ce pas?   But ultimately it is that coordination of forces that is the primary role of the officerial type, isn't it?)

(By the way, and indirectly related,   is a Troop well served with one tank always fighting one man down?   Doesn't the TC's tank always operate at a disadvantage because the TC is double-hatted as both CC and TC?)

Specialized tanks allows the enemy to take out the whole team by taking out certain elements.   Picture a Troop of our tanks with two "tank killers" and two "bunker-busters."   It enters into a meeting engagement with an enemy who has four general purpose tanks.   Only two of our tanks will be of use, and the enemy only has to kill one of our "tank-killers" to have a huge advantage.   The same could be said if this troop has to support the infantry clearing a position or fight through a city in that only half of the troop will be able to do anything.   (The same could be said of operating with dismounted infantry.   All the opposition has to do is strip away the infantry with arty and machine gun fire to achieve a tactical advantage. Similar tactical advantages are achieved by neutralizing arty, air superiority, comms superiority, or coordination.    Four GPs against 2 Tank Killers and 2 Inf Tanks could also be resolved in favour of the split team IF the TKs are more effective than the GPs.   Think, perhaps, King Tiger vs Sherman, or even Firefly vs PzKw III.   As to only half of the troop being able to assist, better to have 2 units able to excel than 4 units of limited ability and possibly something of a liability due to design compromises that put them at a tactical disadvantage - too heavy to cross a bridge to extricate themselves, too long a gun to be able to traverse or elevate effectively.   Having said that, perhaps the tanks that are not effective in the city should be regrouped and the effective tanks formed into usable troops.   Leave the rest of the tanks on the perimeter where they are effective.)

If the cost of dual-purpose (or even all-purpose) tanks is money and inefficiency then I think we should be willing to pay it.   While we are cyphering, is it really cheaper to have 50 "tank-killers" and 50 "bunker-busters" or 100 all purpose "gunslingers"?   (Money is limited. Money is always limited. Money will always be limited.   -   Every army ever raised has faced that fact.   Even the Yanks.   The only point of debate is what compromises are to be made.   All systems are optimized around a defined specification.   The further their employment from their specification the less efficient they are. A spear makes a lousy shovel. It makes a worse oar.   As to generating one all-singing, all-dancing solution vs a pair of similar systems and which is cheaper - honestly I don't know.   I have seen viable cases for both.   Some capabiliities are common, some are complementary and some are competitive.   The more common and complementary the capabilities then the fewer compromises have to be made.     Angle of elevation and length of barrel seem to be two critical criteria that are in competition with respect to role. )

In longer range terms there is even more uncertainty facing an army.   The recent past can offer a guide, but the future is unknown.   Troops will go into situations with the kit they have and will rarely have time to acquire new systems to deal with each new theatre.   Western expeditionary armies should be based on flexible systems.   The M1 was designed for more or less open fighting against other tanks.   It has excelled at that, but it has also proven itself in urban battles against irregulars.   It's ammo needed to be tweaked and some better protection for MGs devised but otherwise the basic design has translated well to urban ops.   Could the inverse also be true?   Could a tank designed to take out insurgents in a city be able to deal with enemy tanks in the open?   (A gun tank has more machine guns, sensors and armour added to it, slowing it down in the process, in order to meet the threat in a new environment.   Could a "mortar" tank have ATGMs tacked onto the outside to supply both long range Direct and Indirect Fire Support to a Gun formation operating in open country?)

We could certainly use some of the heavy APCs that we talk about, and specialized "armour" has a place for specialized situations.   (Agreed) I would still argue, however, that our gun tanks need to be as all-purpose as feasible.   (Ultimately we agree here as well, with a heavy emphasis on "as feasible").

Cheers,

2B

And Cheers to you.

PS - after reviewing this and considering some of your other posts: How averse would you be to a 20 tank Squadron with 14 Gun tanks, conventionally organized and a 6 "tank" fire support troop based on a common chassis but equipped with a turreted 120mm and a pair of 8 km Gill/Spikes hung on each side of the turret?

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

That'll teach me to write long posts!

I'll start with the crew commander/troop leader bit.  A Troop Leader has both crew commanding and Tp leading to accomplish.  This sounds easy, but it involves being able to listen to two conversations on the radio while talking in another one on your ICS.  Troop Leaders are helped by training (as you mention) but also by how we structure the Troop.  He should get an excellent crew.  As a Leopard Tp Ldr my loader was a MCpl, my gunner was a Cpl with six years on tanks and my driver was the top candidate on the dvr course.  OCs and BCs will have even more senior crews, as SHQ is a fairly select bunch.  This means as a BC I didn't have to supervise too much (much easier with the new drills).

The Troop Leader also has a Sgt as his fire team partner (the Bravo) which is a big help.  OCs and BCs are generally not the ones making the most engagements, but their senior crews can help them both command and control the Sqn and fight their tank.  In a firebase as the BC I would let my gunner do his thing while I watched the whole firebase and kept my eyes on the maneouvre force.

Coming to the coordination of the arms, this is indeed what we pay our field leaders for.  It is not easy, but you are right that with training and ability it is possible.  That being said, I'd like to keep it simple up front.  If we are doing conventional warfighting style ops I want to be able to assign firebase, assault and intimate support tasks on the fly without trying to remember if callsign 21 has one close support tank or two.  By having three Tps with identical tanks (dual-purpose), my team can react regardless of formation.  The same would go for the infantry platoons.

Going to terrain, I wasn't trying to infer that we would be suprised by the terrain coming up, but rather than by having all-purpose tanks we can plough forward with our panzers without constantly re-organizing and re-grouping.  The nice thing about modern tanks is the size of the guns.  A 105mm to 120mm (heck, through in 125m) gun can fire a wide variety of ammo with good effects against a variety of targets.  Specialized demolition guns today might have dimishing marginal returns compared to the 1940s. 

By all means we can have some specialized armour held centrally.  In a sense we do that already with the engineering versions.

I'll back up a step and say that Recce organizations could have a greater variety of systems pushed down to a lower level, due in part to their need to opeate decentralized across a wider frontage. 

Now, would I like to have a six vehicle armoured mortar Tp attached to the Tank Sqn?  Certainly.  A Tp with long-range missiles?  Of course.  The general purpose gunslinging tanks up front will still shape the battle and be able to deal with any target on the ground if required.  The tanks will define the enemy (assuming some risk in doing so) allowing the other systems to then be used to their best advantage.  These in turn will allow the tanks to push on past their danger areas.  Not terribly revolutionary, I suppose, but until individual power armour and personal cloaking devices (across all spectrums) it may have to do!

If the gun/armour race gets to the point where we cannot have dual-purpoe guns (perhaps armour gets so "thick" that only some kind of rail gun can penetrate, and that rail gun in turn cannot shoot at anything other than AFVs), then I suppose we'll have to have mixed organizations. 

2B

p.s. I forgot to stipulate that future tank designs must maintain the ability to set-up a crew tent on the back deck. 

 

[Kirkhill]

I enjoyed the challenge 2B

The real reason I brought up the question of CC/TL conflict of duties was to try and get to the issue you and Lance were discussing.  As I understand it you and he were effectively suggesting that a tank can be fought without the CC, just gunner, loader and driver.  Isn't that what you were suggesting when you were discussing gunners designating there own targets?  Anyway on to "dual purpose" tanks...

Actually, on consideration, I don't see any particular reason not to continue with the current, admittedly very flexible, medium tank design.  It  does what it does exceptionally well and, like lancers that were reintroduced in the 1890s, they have their place on many battlefields, just not all.  On the other hand, Lance's Mortar tank, with short barrel, high elevation, direct fire capability, with or without ATGMs could supply both your Fire support (6 per Squadron, detachable to 2 per Troop) and also an Urban combat capability perhaps..... How would you feel about losing your Mortars on occasion to an Infantry company or battalion while the rest of the Squadron were otherwise occupied?

From my read of what you are saying is that you don't have a problem with mixed, large recce troops, or mixed squadrons (read combat team), it is only the mixed tank troop that you have a problem with.  Is that about right?

 

[TCBF]

Mount the mortar in a bin in the back deck, where it belongs.

A big tube is fine - you can fire a missle out of it, but it should be 152mm plus to maximise the shaped charge math.  Hyper velocity missles are another (near future) option.

A trained crew is a work of art.  An untrained crew are four dead men who don't know it yet.

Awaiting the FST generation of lighter AFVs enabled by lighter power packs and armour, the active defensive measures will come into a world of their own in the next ten years or so.

Tom

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

Kirkhill,

I sure hope I'm not like one of the Cavalry officers in 1898 arguing for the use of "lancers!"  

I guess you've found the crux of my unease!   I want the tank Troop kept homogenous, but am flexible beyond that.   Indiret "Fire support" Troops (LAV 120mm for example) allocated to Sqns/Teams and TFs/BGs would be a good thing.   I never understood why a Canadian Armoured Regt did not have a Mortar Tp.   If I were a Combat Team commander I would be delighted to have a dedicated indirect fire support asset that could bring fire anywhere in my battle space.   Whether I'd get that luxury is another!   I guess that the LAV 120mm would be even more handy as they could perhaps fire "semi-indirectly" from long range without the need for an FSCC. This indirect fire support Tp and a tank Tp would be a potent fire base, while the mortars would be able to extricate a leading tank Tp from trouble.

Back to crew duties, each crew commander is faced with handling several tasks.   Troop Leader's tanks are still able to engage targets.   In an infantry platoon and company I am told that the commanders do not normally fire their weapons to enable them to do their command job effectively. A Tank Tp cannot afford to have a quarter of its firepower unengaged.   A good crew, however, compensates for the Tp Ldr's distractions of crew commanding, Tp leading and listening on the Sqn net.   On his own he'd be swamped like the poor French crew commanders, platoon leaders and company commanders in 1940. Their powerful tanks were rendered useless by their one-man turrets.

I like Lance's idea of the gunner being the 2IC.   I argued for this concept in my mess and encountered rather stiff resistance to the concept.   I guess its a moot point now.   There are pros and cons, but in the fight the gunner should have the training, experience and authority to take care of business when the crew commander is otherwise engaged (maneuvering the tank for example or plotting a contact).

Cheers,

Iain

p.s. A Troop of Flamethrower tanks held centrally would also be handy for some situations.

 

[George Wallace]

2B

I always had that argument about who was 2 i/c of the tank.  I agree that it should be the Gunner, as the Loader is quite often the least experienced of the crew.  Where our problem started, in this argument, lay in the fact that being at 'Peace', our second most experienced guy in the tank usually wanted to have his head up and enjoy the view, sticking the least experienced into the 'hole' to read a book through Fall Ex/Reforger.

Kirkhill

I like your idea of the Mortars.  I would only have four, leaving the Sqn Comd tanks intact, in your 20 tank Sqn.  Currently we are working with four troops of four tanks and three tanks in SHQ (one being the Dozer tank).  (19 tanks)

In Italy and NW Europe, the RCD fought with a Support Troop of howitzers mounted in White Halftracks.  Mortars would not be a new innovation.  In the 1980's the Armour Regt's were to have TOW, but although they arrived at the Regt's, they were never issued to the Troops.  Those TOW found their way over to the Inf Bns.  (CWO Skelding was qualified TOW Gnr, but never got to work on them, back in 1979 in the 8 CH(PL) as did a number of Armd soldiers.)  Tom and Lance remember those days of TOW/No TOW.

Budget cuts through the years have been the main problem and cause of many of our reorganizations and reallocations of equip.

 

[Kirkhill]

I think I am starting to see your situation a little more clearly.   Age, infantry training, a militia background and lack of recent experience may all be working to slow things down. ;D


2B: I figured after I wrote it, that that comment about lancers might be misconstrued.   IMHO, there was a role for the Lancers back in the 1890s when machine guns and barbed wire were not yet universal.   In theatres with vast, open spaces the horse was the most mobile   (TAC,OP, STRAT) platform available.   That was true through the 1940s.   Judging by events in Afghanistan, they are still not completely without their uses.   The lance was a light weapon, not logistically taxing, which gave the attacking trooper an advantage of reach over troops on the ground or even sword carrying horsemen.   They just weren't very useful against an "industrial" army.   No "Col. Blimp" suggestions were implied.   Anyway....

Back to the issues.

So with the exception of (oops error got caught with fingers working out of coordination with brain, 'pologies) Iain and George seem supportive of having some sort of alternate vehicle available.   Tom prefers to put the mortar on the back deck of each tank.   I am not particularly taken with Tom's notion because of the impact it would have on vehicle size, supplying adequate ammunition and maintaining the tube.

If we accept that an alternate vehicle can be integrated at some command level (tp/sqn/regt), and we accept that, as Iain has stated, that systems should be as multi-functional as feasible, and if we stipulate that high velocity = long barrel = low angle while low velocity permits short barrel which allows high angle then it seems that that equals the primary dividing line in turret design.   If that is stipulated then the next thing to do is look for complementary tasks that do not degrade the performance of the system in its primary role.   Which brings us back to the notion of Lance's Direct Fire Capable Mortar having a secondary role in supporting urban combat.  

If we then assume that the infantry will be calling for support in the urban environment, and DF Mor Tks might work better there then I could see a case for spending more on Mor Tks for the Armoured Corps than the Armoured Corps types might think necessary to meet their minimum needs.   For example 4 to 6 mors might be all that a Regt needs when employed as a Regt but 4 to 6 per Sqn would allow the regt to meet its minimum requirements and detach some mors to other tasks.   Alternately larger numbers make it more likely that a Sqn OC   or even a Tp Ldr is going to have them on hand if the Tp or Sqn is deployed independently, perhaps a more likely employment these days   than as part of a larger formation.

So George, we could take your standard 20 tank Sqn and convert one 4 tk Tp to a 4 mor Tp.   Less hassles with drills etc.

As to the subject of crewing tanks, 2,3 or 4 members.

What do you think about building 3-man tanks with a 4th seat?   Use the design principles of the LAV/Scorpion/Scimitar/T72/O-M 60 mm turrets, apply them to a 105/120/125/152mm tube, and build a vehicle that can win the individual crew competitions at CAT with only 3 crew.   Leave the 4th seat open for the Coordinator (for want of a better word).    The Tp Ldr has got one eye fwd and one eye on the rt flank.   The Tp 2ic has got one eye on the left flank and one eye on the rear.   The other two CCs primary responsibility is to conform to either the Tp Ldr's or Tp Sgt's tk.   All four "Co-ordinators" are responsible for keeping their eyes open and monitoring the battle space.  

2B: you brought up the question of Infantry officers not using their weapons.   In fact I had instructors tell me that if I was using my weapon while in a command appointment I was not doing my job and if I "needed" to use my weapon I had screwed up.   There is some logic behind carrying ashplants, umbrellas and pace sticks.   It encourages the officer to focus on how best to employ the available forces so that he personally doesn't become a casualty.   Carrying a rifle in the assault is no more a guarantor of personal safety than an umbrella, at least not until you get up close and then the pistol comes in handy.

Perhaps that psychological "distance" between the commander and the soldier to soldier battle needs to be emphasised.   The Sqn OC, the BC, the Regt CO etc surely they are not involved in fighting their own tank?   Surely they are primarily fighting the unit?   I understand that some armies don't give Commanders tanks.    They give them command APCs (the Spaniards come to mind).

 

[ArmyRick]

As an infantry sect comd, I think the platoon commander should carry a C8 or even the C8 CQB for his own personal defence. Their are even times when the plan goes to sh*t and the officer may be fighting for his own life (especially in an ugly urban fight). But on a well plan and well executed assault with murphy not throwing wrenches in the middle, then yes, that PL COMD pers wpn should not fire. The PL COMD real weapons are 3 sections and a wpns det.

Kirkhill, neat idea for a Co-ordinator or Crew commander for 3 man AFV crews.

 

[Kirkhill]

Thanks ArmyRick

Re personal weapons - as I understand it the practice of officers carrying rifles started in WWI just as a means of blending in with the scenery.  They weren't primarily meant to be used.  In fact the entire practice was originally looked on with disdain.  Not quaaht the done thing, donchano.  Probably all due to the loss "decent" officer material and the promotion from the ranks of guys like my grandad.  Oh how standards have suffered.

Back on your point though - the C8 CQB might be a reasonable compromise.  A logistically sound personal defence weapon that doesn't stand out from the pack.

 

[George Wallace]

Re personal weapons - as I understand it the practice of officers carrying rifles started in WWI just as a means of blending in with the scenery.   They weren't primarily meant to be used.   In fact the entire practice was originally looked on with disdain.   Not quaaht the done thing, donchano.   Probably all due to the loss "decent" officer material and the promotion from the ranks of guys like my grandad.   Oh how standards have suffered.

It was also from lessons learned in Vietnam.   Snipers had a habit of looking for the Radioman and then shooting the guy next to him.   The guy who is different, is the target.   When I was driving the Div Comd, the D&S and all his staff, would dress the same.   99 wears a beret, all wear a beret.   99 wears a helmet, all wear a helmet.   etc.    

 

[Old Sweat]

The practice of officers carrying a rifle predates the First World War by many years. I have photographs of officer of 2 RCR in South Africa. In these shots, they are armed with rifles, and indeed the battalion drew 32 Lee-Metford rifles shortly after arriving in theatre. Thirty-two is the numbers of offciers in the eight rifle companies. As well, I saw a painting of a British officer of the French and Indian Wars period who was carrying a musket, actually a fusil, which was a light small arm. He had discarded his sword and toned down much of his "officer gear."

 

[TangoTwoBravo]

The issue of the crew commander and Tp ldr/BC/OC/CO is certainly a good one and it is something that Engineers designing a tank in isolation might not think about.  Perhaps I am constrained by my experience, but to me a tank officer in the Sqns fights both his "unit" and his tank (not that I've actually fought a real enemy in my tanks).  It is tricky, I suppose, but it is one reason why people fail Phase training.

I went along as an observer with a series of company live fires conducted by a Light Infantry battalion a couple of years ago.  It was a fascinating experience and it certainly gave me some perspective.  It did strike me that the pl comds and OC did usually fire their weapons and I completely understood the rationale.  There are lots of rifles and other weapons in a company I suppose.

In a tank unit the leadership cannot afford to stay unengaged, although OCs and COs should not be firing too many rounds.  In a fourteen tank Sqn we could not afford to have five radio tanks and nine gun tanks.  I guess we could put the Tp Ldrs and above in APCs and follow behind but there would be several issues including Leadership.  Our officers up front should be sharing the risks (if not being the lead callsign down the road).  We'd also be adding five more vehicles to the Sqn without really increasing the combat power.  I can see "command tanks" for COs that do not have gunnery systems inside but instead have C2 stuff, but OCs, BCs and Tp Ldrs should be capable of joining in.

Going back to the airforce analogy, do fighters have "command fighters" that stay un-engaged, or do some guys do both?  Since I'm not a pilot I cannot answer for sure but I think that the tactical leaders still fight their own aircraft.  Its not a perfect analogy, but perhaps it speaks to what I am trying to express.

As a BC on a live fire (or dry) combat team attack I would almost always be in the Fire Base with at least one Troop of tanks.  I would give my gunner his arcs and my intent and pretty much let him do his thing while I watched and talked.  In a sense, the gunner was "commanding" the shoots as I focused on coordination.  That being said I was still crew commanding the tank into position and confirming that the gunner was engaging the right targets.  I would watch the manouevre force and talk them onto the position, giving them information on the objective.  I'd also check the fire of the Fire Base.  At the same time I'd be feeding SITREPs to Battle Group HQ and trying to allow the OC to focus his attention on the combat team net.  I guess I could have done this from an APC, but that would be adding yet another vehicle just to carry me and the radios.  I could do it from a tank, still provide firepower and not stick out as a soft target.  Does it sound like I miss my tank?  (Good ol' Black Bear  ).

On attacks the OC was front and centre, although perhaps hanging a little back from the lead tanks.  This is risky, but it has the advantages of leading from the front and having the boss up front where he can see what is going on.  If he is hit then the Inf OC behind is there to run the assault and the BC is in the Fire Base.  The front line leadership piece rarely comes out in peacetime but I imagine it is rather more important when the bullets start flying.

We can give gunners more freedom to engage, although there are fratricide risks and oversight is still a good thing.  I guess my main point is that a tank's performance will be more than the sum of its armour, gun and mobility (nothing radical here).  The ability of the crew to harness the tank's capabilities will also play a factor.  This, therefore, must be incorporated into the design of the tank even if makes the job hard for the engineers.

This may sound irrationale, but I don't like the sound of "coordinator."  With a four man crew I could command the tank and still coordinate the actions of the other tanks and elements.  That being said, I was asking for a info systems operator a couple of days ago!

I guess that ships in the navy often have a "captain" who fights the ship and perhaps a more senior officer who is fighting the unit of ships (whatever they call them - flotillas?)  This is, perhaps, a little more like what you are proposing.  It makes more sense tactically, but ships are so much bigger that maybe you can stick an extra command team into the ship design with more ease than into an AFV.  The AFV is a compromise.  We are trying to cram as much capability as we can into a small space.  Perhaps one "cost" is that commanders are doubled hatted.  That is why we give the commanders in an armoured unit experienced crews (the OC will have a Sgt as his loader) to help with this.

Guess I'm trying to have my cake and eat it too again!

Cheers,

2B

 

[Kirkhill]

2B: I take your point on Gun tanks vs Radio Tanks and Command APCs.  I don't think I am proposing Command APCs as a viable alternative. I understand leadership and shared risk.

Nor do I think we need to strip out the guns to put 44 set, radio operator and clerk on board.

I am proposing building a three man tank, complete with existing guns, under the command of the loader or gunner. 

Then onto that tank graft a fourth seat with keyboard and screen, hatch optional, for the "staff/command/co-ordinating" element.    Rationale is based on the net-centric capabilities pioneered by those canny Swedes (there they are again) and their Grippen aircraft which work in conjunction with their Erieye AWACs  The interesting part about the Erieye is that they have no command staff, or operators on board, just the pilot and co-pilot.  The Erieye radar is netted to the ground AND to the Grippens.  The pilot has access to all available info. 

I'm not going to argue as to whether or not that results in information overload.  I just would point out that that capability is jammed into a tight space occupied by one individual along with a whole raft of other systems. 

From that I suggest that a command station, with seat, comms, keyboard and screen (and hatch) is not completely impracticable. 

Desirable?  You tell me.

 

[Lance Wiebe]

Good grief!  Don't log on for a little while, and look what happens!

The reason I posted the picture of the AVRE in my last post was to illustrate a point, which you guys have been beating around.  The AVRE mounted a 160mm gun, designed specifically to destroy structures.  The AVRE and the tank could be switched by swapping turrets in and out, and changing the ammo bin.  Thus, common hull, but a tank that could be modified as the situation dictated.  Mind you, the gun was low velocity, and short ranged, but by golly, it carried a round that had one heck of a wallop!  I wonder, it being 50 years since that thing was developed, if a better demolition gun exists?  To my knowledge, the AVRE was the only post war tank based direct fire platform designed specifically to destroy buildings and fortifications.  It was not designed to destroy armour, but I shudder to think what the crew would look like if their vehicle was hit with one of those monster shells!

Next point, I have done some thinking, we need a hatch for the commander.  Modern cameras, LCD screens, computers and so on will not be able to replace the human eye.  The French conducted a study a few years back, and found that commanders forced to stay inside quickly lost complete situational awareness.  Not tactical awareness, mind you.  (That is also one of the things I wrote about being a knock against the MGS.) 

So, my new tank will not have an external gun, my new tank will have a low profile turret, with a two man crew.  Two man, because the turret can be made lower with a two man crew.  (obviously, with an autoloader, the Cougar concept is dead....) But that limits elevation, and thus limits its usefulness in built up areas.  Therefore, my new tank design will incorporate two different turrets, one with a high velocity gun designed specifically for AP (although other rounds may be fired from it), and the other with a low velocity gun designed specifically for HE (again, other rounds may be developed for it).  Instead of a 160 mm gun as in the AVRE, I am leaning toward a long barrelled breech loaded 120 mm mortar with direct and indirect fire capabilities.  So now, in my minds eye, my new tank design is starting to gain some kind of a fuzzy shape.

 

[TCBF]

Lance, remember texas in 78?  The USA had an M60 engr Tk - M728 - with a Brit L9A1 165mm dml gun.

But here is what we could do with our 1300 M113s!

http://www.geocities.com/equipmentshop/m113combat.htm

tom