Justin Trudeau hints at boosting Canada’s military spending

I'll believe it when I see it.

 

[Navy_Pete]

When someone gives you $31 Billion a year, and you spend half of it on salaries, you better have a darn good excuse for saying no.

That doesn't really translate into working equipment though when budgets for parts, training, in service projects etc get cut, and capitol projects get slowed down by the government (while also needing more people to do the project work because of the ludicrous bureaucracy).

Because the ops tempo is so high whatever is left is just spread thin so that instead of having some sustainable capability and some capability gaps, we've burned the candles at both ends for long enough to break everything or let it rust out.

At the moment for this year I don't have funding to support basic ongoing maintenance for life saving equipment that is required to make sure it stays working, so trying to figure out what is the lowest priority fire fighting equipment that will get cut. Not even really talking about anything fancy, just basic COTs equipment that meets commercial marine rules.

 

[dimsum]

That doesn't really translate into working equipment though when budgets for parts, training, in service projects etc get cut, and capitol projects get slowed down by the government (while also needing more people to do the project work because of the ludicrous bureaucracy).

Because the ops tempo is so high whatever is left is just spread thin so that instead of having some sustainable capability and some capability gaps, we've burned the candles at both ends for long enough to break everything or let it rust out.

At the moment for this year I don't have funding to support basic ongoing maintenance for life saving equipment that is required to make sure it stays working, so trying to figure out what is the lowest priority fire fighting equipment that will get cut. Not even really talking about anything fancy, just basic COTs equipment that meets commercial marine rules.

Dumb aircrew question here:

If aircraft don’t have the working Aircraft Life Saving Equipment onboard, it’s grounded. Why is that principle not the same for ships, aside from COs not wanting to “look bad”?

I put “look bad” in quotes because to me, having a fire or something onboard and not having enough equipment to fight it is slightly more embarrassing than not sailing because of it.

 

[GR66]

That doesn't really translate into working equipment though when budgets for parts, training, in service projects etc get cut, and capitol projects get slowed down by the government (while also needing more people to do the project work because of the ludicrous bureaucracy).

Because the ops tempo is so high whatever is left is just spread thin so that instead of having some sustainable capability and some capability gaps, we've burned the candles at both ends for long enough to break everything or let it rust out.

At the moment for this year I don't have funding to support basic ongoing maintenance for life saving equipment that is required to make sure it stays working, so trying to figure out what is the lowest priority fire fighting equipment that will get cut. Not even really talking about anything fancy, just basic COTs equipment that meets commercial marine rules.

I think that kind of proves the point that @FJAG was trying to make. If you can't afford to properly equip all the salaries you're paying then perhaps you have to reduce the amount you're spending on salaries (by either reducing the number of PY's where possible or as he'd suggest changing some of those salaries from full-time to cheaper part-time salaries) in order to free up the money required to properly equip (and maintain) the force.

 

[Kirkhill]

I think that kind of proves the point that @FJAG was trying to make. If you can't afford to properly equip all the salaries you're paying then perhaps you have to reduce the amount you're spending on salaries (by either reducing the number of PY's where possible or as he'd suggest changing some of those salaries from full-time to cheaper part-time salaries) in order to free up the money required to properly equip (and maintain) the force.

Even if you can't swap person dollars for kit dollars why are you spending money on people you can't employ because they don't have kit?

And I know that people will argue that they are short of people but if you are also short of working hulls then tie up half the fleet.

Sometimes you just have to say "you can't get there from here."

 

[Navy_Pete]

Dumb aircrew question here:

If aircraft don’t have the working Aircraft Life Saving Equipment onboard, it’s grounded. Why is that principle not the same for ships, aside from COs not wanting to “look bad”?

I put “look bad” in quotes because to me, having a fire or something onboard and not having enough equipment to fight it is slightly more embarrassing than not sailing because of it.

We 'accept the risk', and ships frequently deploy on HR operations with defects that don't meet basic SOLAS requirements (let alone have combat survivability capabilities).

It's a bone of contention as we used to delay sailings sometimes to actually repair things; that's a lot more rare, even though the ships are in worse condition. We have theoretical certification but it's a rubber stamp exercise, and even when we've recommended some safety areas not get certified it gets it anyway.

@GR66, not really, they are different pots of money, and it's not like people aren't busy, it's just that everyone is running around plugging holes and doing work arounds and mitigations vice actually just fixing things and doing their job. So it's a high LOE for a lot lower effective return in actual operational capacity. It's like the old line that it costs a lot to be poor because you replace your cheap shoes a lot more.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Even if you can't swap person dollars for kit dollars why are you spending money on people you can't employ because they don't have kit?

And I know that people will argue that they are short of people but if you are also short of working hulls then tie up half the fleet.

Sometimes you just have to say "you can't get there from here."

Because we have uniformed senior leadership that won't say no to the Government and their commitments.

And that trickles down throughout the CAF to the tactical level.

 

[SeaKingTacco]

Because we have uniformed senior leadership that won't say no to the Government and their commitments.

And that trickles down throughout the CAF to the tactical level.

We also have a Tactical level that will not tell the truth to the Strategic Level. And the tools to see system wide readiness are poor.

 

[rmc_wannabe]

We also have a Tactical level that will not tell the truth to the Strategic Level. And the tools to see system wide readiness are poor.

We do tell truth at the tactical level. The problem is that there is apathy after a while of being told your tactical problem is not in keeping with the strategic vision of those on high that are, in turn, affecting the tactical level.

I can look up and out as much as the next leader, but when I have no kit, half my pers, and double the work load... I am putting out fires more than I am giving a shit about where we're going as the CAF or how it fits in with "strategic visioning."

Strategic visioning doesn't make us fit to fight tonight.

 

[Halifax Tar]

We also have a Tactical level that will not tell the truth to the Strategic Level. And the tools to see system wide readiness are poor.

Yes, we definitely have boot lickers at the tactical level.

 

[Furniture]

Yes, we definitely have boot lickers at the tactical level.

Who'd imagine that would be the result of a promotion system that revolves around making yourself look as good as possible to the people above you...

 

[Kirkhill]

I reckon the problem solves itself when sea-cocks won't close.

 

[CountDC]

it is interesting to see the comments here on people in the chain needing to stand up. It is important to note that this at times starts at the lower levels and feeds upwards so the high levels are actually aware of the issues.

A good example. Those in the reserves long enough will remember the good old OOPS, I mean IRPPS system in the early 90s. I once had a meeting with the LF Comd and told him straight up what I thought of the system and the issues involved. He mentioned that the day before he had been to the Compt shop and the Cpl there told him everything was great. I showed him my file of system errors affecting mbrs pay that I filed with Ottawa everyday along with the list of local payments I arranged and he was shocked. The big issue was that right down to the lowest level he was told the system was working great when it wasn't thus when he had meetings with higher he was not raising any concerns. The same people that told him everything was great would also complain that nothing was getting done to fix it. I asked what did they expect the Comd to push for fixing when they told him there was nothing to be fixed. Of course in true military style I was the bad guy because I didn't play along and pretend for the Comd everything was good.

I have continued to see this same thing play out over the years where people continue to blow smoke up the senior officers butts and then complain about them not taking the action they believe should be done. If you are aware of the fault and don't mention it when presented with the opportunity then you have become part of the fault. Sure there is the chance nothing will change but at least you did your part.

 

[ueo]

We also have a Tactical level that will not tell the truth to the Strategic Level. And the tools to see system wide readiness are poor.

Lotsa tools, even a few that work!

 

[MilEME09]

Who'd imagine that would be the result of a promotion system that revolves around making yourself look as good as possible to the people above you...

being more about who you know rather then how good you are at your job is how many units are a mess.

 

[Kirkhill]

it is interesting to see the comments here on people in the chain needing to stand up. It is important to note that this at times starts at the lower levels and feeds upwards so the high levels are actually aware of the issues.

A good example. Those in the reserves long enough will remember the good old OOPS, I mean IRPPS system in the early 90s. I once had a meeting with the LF Comd and told him straight up what I thought of the system and the issues involved. He mentioned that the day before he had been to the Compt shop and the Cpl there told him everything was great. I showed him my file of system errors affecting mbrs pay that I filed with Ottawa everyday along with the list of local payments I arranged and he was shocked. The big issue was that right down to the lowest level he was told the system was working great when it wasn't thus when he had meetings with higher he was not raising any concerns. The same people that told him everything was great would also complain that nothing was getting done to fix it. I asked what did they expect the Comd to push for fixing when they told him there was nothing to be fixed. Of course in true military style I was the bad guy because I didn't play along and pretend for the Comd everything was good.

I have continued to see this same thing play out over the years where people continue to blow smoke up the senior officers butts and then complain about them not taking the action they believe should be done. If you are aware of the fault and don't mention it when presented with the opportunity then you have become part of the fault. Sure there is the chance nothing will change but at least you did your part.

Courage takes all sorts of forms, doesn't it?

 

[YZT580]

I think that kind of proves the point that @FJAG was trying to make. If you can't afford to properly equip all the salaries you're paying then perhaps you have to reduce the amount you're spending on salaries (by either reducing the number of PY's where possible or as he'd suggest changing some of those salaries from full-time to cheaper part-time salaries) in order to free up the money required to properly equip (and maintain) the force.

Why is it that the civil service can increase by 20% with nary a word said in opposition. Each of those positions require specific equipment to do the mandated task: be it computer, desk, automobile or whatever. So each new employee is equipped with the tools required. What is so different with the military? There are specific designated tasks requiring a known number of PYs and each task requires specific equipment that costs X dollars. That is simple logic. So if the government wants to reduce costs, it must look at reducing task assignment or it must justify doing more with less. It shouldn't be up to the generals to suggest that you don't need specific equipment

 

[Furniture]

Even if you can't swap person dollars for kit dollars why are you spending money on people you can't employ because they don't have kit?

And I know that people will argue that they are short of people but if you are also short of working hulls then tie up half the fleet.

Sometimes you just have to say "you can't get there from here."

Cut pers numbers, and you'll still end up at salary being about 50% of the budget. It will happen because over time the only thing the GoC can't really cut from the CAF is pay.

We have already tried the race to the bottom approach to national defence. Digging through the bottom won't fix anything.

 

[Kirkhill]

Why is it that the civil service can increase by 20% with nary a word said in opposition. Each of those positions require specific equipment to do the mandated task: be it computer, desk, automobile or whatever. So each new employee is equipped with the tools required. What is so different with the military? There are specific designated tasks requiring a known number of PYs and each task requires specific equipment that costs X dollars. That is simple logic. So if the government wants to reduce costs, it must look at reducing task assignment or it must justify doing more with less. It shouldn't be up to the generals to suggest that you don't need specific equipment

If all of those people had been tasked to DND support, CSE, Transport Canada, Canadian Space Agency and a multitude of other civil-military capabilities, even Mounties, Border Security, Environment Patrols, SAR, Emergency Response people then I would not be complaining. It would leave the uniformed CAF personnel focused on there primary task as defined by one of your previous CDS.

"We are not the Public Service of Canada. We are not just another department. We are the Canadian Forces and our job is to be able to kill people,"

If I were Poilievre, and were dealt the hand that he has I wouldn't be firing Trudeau's new hires. I would be reassigning them. Billets in Resolute, Cambridge Bay, Whitehorse and Iqaluit sound good for starters.

 

[FJAG]

Honestly, I have no idea how bad it is at the coal-face these days but you have to remember that I'm a guy that lived through Trudeau the First's army when we were worse than decimated. The arty lost half of its numbers, we lost an entire brigade and our equipment, for the most part, was manufactured in the early 1950s. Like the Eveready Bunny we just kept going, and going, and going with Centurion tanks, M113s, Ferret scout cars and L5 pack howitzers. The navy had old rusting Tribals (the Bony had just been laid up) and the air force flew Starfighters and Voodoos and Huey's.

We've had cycles of feast and famine. Over and over again. Throughout that half century I noted two overriding issues. First, our administration grew ever more complex requiring an ever expanding bureaucracy to manage it. More and more people and money kept being swallowed into Ottawa while units became smaller and less capable. Second, politicians of all stripes were amateurs respecting the military and industry. They needed input from the military professionals but were not getting enough of it. The 1960s were an era where McNamara was espousing "system analysis" for the US forces and it was jumped on by our bureaucrats - the result was longer decision cycles, more committees, more cross departmental collaboration, all of which empowered the bureaucracy but downplayed the hard military experience. Vietnam was a massive failure that made the US military re-examine itself and chart a new course. We never had a Vietnam and never self-corrected. Trudeau was influenced by outside pressure to modernize the Canadian military in the late 1970s - Ta Da - Leopards, F-18s and Halifax class resulted. Then came Chretien.

By the year 2000 Canada was in major trouble. Bosnia was becoming a major drain on the army's ability to maintain people in the field. All the "lacking boots on the ground" mantras came out of this era. That was mixed with the armoured personnel carrier rationalization that was going on which resulted in the LAV (for a fun read see Craig Stone's 2001 article "An Examination of the Armoured Personnel Carrier Replacement Project" for an examination on how sausages are made). Then came 9/11 and we ended up with the wonderful world of Leo IIs, M777s, C-17s and new Chinooks.

The problem is that there is a disconnect between the political class and our senior leadership that seems to only come together when a crisis occurs and the military leadership can run to the politicians with a claim that their pants are on fire and they need an immediate bailout. For well over 50 years, the military leadership and the government have not been able to sit down and plan out a rational strategy for a long range future. There are numerous short range plans (and I consider Advancing With Purpose to be one of those). There have been numerous acquisitions along the way. Some arising out of immediate crises (like the M777) and others out of long term ones (rust out of our logistics fleets and ships). Some like JUSTAS/RPAS have dragged on for years (experimentally since 2000 as a policy since 2006, as a restarted policy in 2017, as a flying aircraft - some day soon)

Despite the fact that there are good meaning, intelligent and capable people within the military, the connection between the professional military and the professional politicians is weak. There have been few champions within the MND position to make things happen in a logical and strategic fashion. Everything is transactional. If one were a cynic, like me, Trudeau II's choice as his first MND was designed specifically to ensure that no connection existed. We have for decades now not had a national mobilization plan for either the military or industry. We agree to a 2% of GDP funding formula but have no plan to get there. Even the party most bullish on defence had no problems cutting funding when the economy took a tank in 2008.

I guess all of that is to say that where the serving folks are now is nothing new. We've been there for over a half a century, and even since we became a country. It's Canada's way of life. Unless there is a major crisis, strategic thinking takes a back seat.

If there is one difference, however, it's that the military has never before been funded as heavily as it is now. $31 billion isn't chum change. It shows the willingness of how much the government will commit. My biggest beef is that the military, like the civil service, has become addicted to the drug of how much of its loot it is prepared to shovel into a full-time bureaucracy. And believe me, a bureaucracy is always able to prove that it needs more. It's the direct link between the organization and the government and its priorities will be paramount even if actual defence outputs will suffer. That bureaucracy is both civilian and military. It keeps expanding and full-time personnel costs will forever rise. Unfortunately our collective leadership has only one answer to low defence outputs and that's more money. No government will accept that. It's like a heroin addict saying I can solve the problem if you just give me more heroin.

What's needed is an initiative that looks at a complete rebuilding of the defence structure from the ground up. One that reduces the bureaucratic load on both the department and on the defence industry. One that looks at ongoing day-to-day defence output needs and one that looks to the strategic defence outputs needed for a troubled future. That needs a proactive foreign affairs department which has also been moribund for decades.

 

[Halifax Tar]

Honestly, I have no idea how bad it is at the coal-face these days but you have to remember that I'm a guy that lived through Trudeau the First's army when we were worse than decimated. The arty lost half of its numbers, we lost an entire brigade and our equipment, for the most part, was manufactured in the early 1950s. Like the Eveready Bunny we just kept going, and going, and going with Centurion tanks, M113s, Ferret scout cars and L5 pack howitzers. The navy had old rusting Tribals (the Bony had just been laid up) and the air force flew Starfighters and Voodoos and Huey's.

We've had cycles of feast and famine. Over and over again. Throughout that half century I noted two overriding issues. First, our administration grew ever more complex requiring an ever expanding bureaucracy to manage it. More and more people and money kept being swallowed into Ottawa while units became smaller and less capable. Second, politicians of all stripes were amateurs respecting the military and industry. They needed input from the military professionals but were not getting enough of it. The 1960s were an era where McNamara was espousing "system analysis" for the US forces and it was jumped on by our bureaucrats - the result was longer decision cycles, more committees, more cross departmental collaboration, all of which empowered the bureaucracy but downplayed the hard military experience. Vietnam was a massive failure that made the US military re-examine itself and chart a new course. We never had a Vietnam and never self-corrected. Trudeau was influenced by outside pressure to modernize the Canadian military in the late 1970s - Ta Da - Leopards, F-18s and Halifax class resulted. Then came Chretien.

By the year 2000 Canada was in major trouble. Bosnia was becoming a major drain on the army's ability to maintain people in the field. All the "lacking boots on the ground" mantras came out of this era. That was mixed with the armoured personnel carrier rationalization that was going on which resulted in the LAV (for a fun read see Craig Stone's 2001 article "An Examination of the Armoured Personnel Carrier Replacement Project" for an examination on how sausages are made). Then came 9/11 and we ended up with the wonderful world of Leo IIs, M777s, C-17s and new Chinooks.

The problem is that there is a disconnect between the political class and our senior leadership that seems to only come together when a crisis occurs and the military leadership can run to the politicians with a claim that their pants are on fire and they need an immediate bailout. For well over 50 years, the military leadership and the government have not been able to sit down and plan out a rational strategy for a long range future. There are numerous short range plans (and I consider Advancing With Purpose to be one of those). There have been numerous acquisitions along the way. Some arising out of immediate crises (like the M777) and others out of long term ones (rust out of our logistics fleets and ships). Some like JUSTAS/RPAS have dragged on for years (experimentally since 2000 as a policy since 2006, as a restarted policy in 2017, as a flying aircraft - some day soon)

Despite the fact that there are good meaning, intelligent and capable people within the military, the connection between the professional military and the professional politicians is weak. There have been few champions within the MND position to make things happen in a logical and strategic fashion. Everything is transactional. If one were a cynic, like me, Trudeau II's choice as his first MND was designed specifically to ensure that no connection existed. We have for decades now not had a national mobilization plan for either the military or industry. We agree to a 2% of GDP funding formula but have no plan to get there. Even the party most bullish on defence had no problems cutting funding when the economy took a tank in 2008.

I guess all of that is to say that where the serving folks are now is nothing new. We've been there for over a half a century, and even since we became a country. It's Canada's way of life. Unless there is a major crisis, strategic thinking takes a back seat.

If there is one difference, however, it's that the military has never before been funded as heavily as it is now. $31 billion isn't chum change. It shows the willingness of how much the government will commit. My biggest beef is that the military, like the civil service, has become addicted to the drug of how much of its loot it is prepared to shovel into a full-time bureaucracy. And believe me, a bureaucracy is always able to prove that it needs more. It's the direct link between the organization and the government and its priorities will be paramount even if actual defence outputs will suffer. That bureaucracy is both civilian and military. It keeps expanding and full-time personnel costs will forever rise. Unfortunately our collective leadership has only one answer to low defence outputs and that's more money. No government will accept that. It's like a heroin addict saying I can solve the problem if you just give me more heroin.

What's needed is an initiative that looks at a complete rebuilding of the defence structure from the ground up. One that reduces the bureaucratic load on both the department and on the defence industry. One that looks at ongoing day-to-day defence output needs and one that looks to the strategic defence outputs needed for a troubled future. That needs a proactive foreign affairs department which has also been moribund for decades.

I'm not sure we've ever been in a position where our numbers are so low for people, and of them even less, by a large factor, are really employable on a military mission.

With the exception of prior to WW2 I'm not sure our Navy has ever been in such bad shape. We are going to deploy 2 east coast CPFs this year and this is pretty much all we can muster materially and personnel wise. You should see the trouble I'm having just finding 2 cooks, which I still don't have, so my galley won't collapse during our deployment.

Even back in the end days of the Caddys and steamers we could muster more than this.

The RCN is in a crisis of material and people. And I have to imagine soon our material will start deciding for us what we can actually put to sea. It's time we start looking at what we can get now, what's on offer.